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  *This paper is an expansion of an address presented at the 
Technical University of Milano on May 28, 2010. 
 
1     .   There is of course a huge literature.  My approach is 
based upon Scherer (1996, Chapter 7); Offenhauer and Scherer 

















































































                                                 
2     .  An earlier antitrust suit challenged Microsoft's policy 
of requiring computer assemblers to pay Microsoft a fee for each 
operating system they installed, whether it was Windows or that 
of a rival.  A settlement was negotiated in July 1994.  When 
District Court Judge Stanley Sporkin attempted to broaden the 
terms, he was reversed and removed from the case by an appellate 
court.  See U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F. 2d 1448 (1995).   
Sporkin's ill-fated attempt to broaden the remedy was in part 
informed by the excellent Wallace and Erickson (1992) book. 
3    .  U.S. v. Microsoft Corporation, 84 F.Supp. 2d 9 (1999).  
For blow-by-blow accounts of the Justice Department suit and its 
forerunners, see Auletta (2001) and Heilemann (2001).  I 
participated in the early Justice Department deliberations and 
prepared as a consultant for Sun Microsystems a detailed 



































                                                 
4         .  "Upfront:  Did Microsoft Catch a Break?" Business 
Week,  March 12, 2001, p. 14. 
5    .  U.S. v. Microsoft Corporation, 253 F. 3rd 34 (2001).  In 
fact, Judge Jackson's decision included careful support for a 
rule of reason violation.  The appellate court also Jackson for 
talking about the ongoing case with a reporter and for failing 
to hold hearings on the Justice Department's proposed remedial 
measures.  But see the lengthy amici curiae brief by Litan, 



































6    .  Commission of the European Communities, Decision, Case 
COMP/C-3/37.792 (April 21, 2004). 
7    .  Order of the President of the Court of First Instance, 
December 22, 2004.  I appeared before the Court as a witness on 
behalf of Real Networks.  Sun Microsystems was originally 
scheduled as a complainant but settled its own private treble 
damages suit against Microsoft in the United States for $1.9 
billion and withdrew from the European proceedings. 
8    .  Microsoft Corp. v. Commission, Case T-201/04, September 
17, 2007. 
9    .  "Microsoft in European Court Says 2004 Ruling Is a 















































10    .  From a Reuters news dispatch May 22, 2008, by David 
Lawsky, read on the American Antitrust Institute web site. 
11    .  See Scherer (1977), pp. 59-78; and Scherer 












































12    .  On the early history, see Scherer (1996, pp. 202-204). 
13    .  See Flamm (1993, 2007).  Moore predicted in 1965 that 
integrated circuit density would double annually -- a figure he 
later revised to every 18 months.   
14    .   "Modern Wonders: The Age of the Thing," The Economist, 


























                                                 
15    .  This paragraph is based upon the author's personal 
knowledge gained as a consultant to AMD in AMD's arbitration and 
competition policy disputes with Intel during the 1990s. 
16    .  See "Competitor Wins Right from Intel," New York Times, 
February 25, 1992, p. C1; and (on judicial affirmation) "State 
Court Ruling Protects AMD Rights To Clone, Sell Older Line of 
Intel Chips," Wall Street Journal, January 3, 1995. 
17    .  See Wilson and Warren-Boulton (1995). 
18  The diagram was prepared but not used in connection with the author's work as principal 
economic consultant for a Federal Trade Commission case narrowly focused on Intel's data 
disclosure practices with respect to chip buyers who challenged its patents.  The case was settled 
before trial in 1999.  In the matter of Intel Corporation, FTC docket 9288, Consent Order (1999).  
The diagram was included in the author's testimony before the Court of First Instance in the 
Microsoft case. 
 
  AMD's first 32-bit microprocessor was the AMD-386.  The AMD-486 was a similar 







































                                                 
19    . See Scherer (1996, Chapter 6); and Flamm (1993), 
Chapters 6 and 7.  For a basic theoretical contribution, see 
Spence (1981). 
20    .  It is drawn from Scherer (1996), p. 211, using sales 



































21    .  See Scherer (1996, pp. 212-214). 
22    .  See (on the U.S. case) "Samsung To Pay Large Fine in 
Price-Fixing Conspiracy," New York Times, October 14, 2003; and 
(on the European case) "An Old Chip Cartel Case Is Brought to a 
Swift End," New York Times, May 20, 2010.  Fines of 331 million 
Euros were levied in the latter case. 
23    .  U.S. Federal Trade Commission, Complaint, In the Matter 
of Intel, December 16, 2009, para. 43. 
24    .  See for historical comparison Jones (1920).  See also 












































25    . See Flamm (1993), Chapter 6. 
26    .  In March 1994 the author testified on behalf of AMD 






































                                                 
27    .  In fact, the evidence suggests that AMD had to sell its 
chips at lower list prices than Intel's. 
28    . See for example "Dell in Talks To Settle Itel Inquiry 
With S.E.C.," New York Times, June 11, 2010, p. B1, in which 
Intel's CEO refers to Dell as "the best friend money can buy." 
29    .  Commission Decision, Case COMP/C-3-37990-Intel (May 13, 
2009), provisional non-confidential version, accessible (like 



































30    .  However, it failed to describe Intel's earlier mistake, 
developing at huge cost a 64-bit chip, the Itanium, incompatible 
with prior Intel architecture. 
31    .  The Areeda-Turner rule was argued to be analytically 
deficient by several economists, including a recent Nobel Prize 
laureate.  For a review of the debate, see Scherer and Ross 
(1990), pp. 468-479.  The diligent reader is cautioned that 
Figures 12.2(a) and (b) were transposed. In Matsushita Electric 
Industrial Corp. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, at pp. 584-5, 
the U.S. Supreme Court observed that “there is a good deal of 
debate on what cost is relevant in [alleged predation] cases” 




































                                                 
32    .  In the Matter of Intel Corporation, Docket No. 9341 
(December 16, 2009).  Only a month earlier, AMD settled its own 
private antitrust suit against Intel by accepting $1.25 million 
in alleged damages (which made up nearly all of AMD's reported 
2009 profits).  In November 2009, the State of New York also 
launched an antitrust suit against Intel -- presumably 
stimulated by the ongoing construction of a large AMD-linked 
plant un upper New York state. 
33  In the Matter of Intel Corporation, Docket No. 9341, Decision and Order, August 4, 2010. 
34    .  See also "New Nvidia Chip Steps Closer to 













































35    .  The belief is so deeply and long-ingrained that I am no 























                                                                                                                                                             
sources.  For an anticipation, see Kaysen and Turner (1959), 
especially p. 96. 
 
  It should be noted that structural remedies include not 
only breakup of a single firm into multiple entities, but also 
such actions as merger controls and the compulsory licensing of 
patents or other intellectual property undergirding monopoly 
positions. Intel already had patent licensing agreements with 
its three main competitors, but the Commission's final order 
recognizes that changes in the future could impair their 
effectiveness, 
36    .  For an explicit attempt to weigh structural vs. conduct 
remedies in the U.S. Microsoft case, see Litan et al. (2000). 
37    .  However, Intel has been remarkably dependent upon other 
organizations' basic architectural concept innovations.  See 
Flamm (2007), Figure 12.  
38    .  U.S. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 
(1953), affirmed at 347 U.S. 521 (1954).  On the subsequent 
difficulties, see Scherer (2008), p. 1050, note 67. 

























































































40  In the U.S. FTC's remedial approach to the Intel case, continuing intervention by Intel rivals 
seems inevitable if Intel deviations from the agreed-upon conduct rules are to be monitored. 
41    .   See also the "leader, "Prosecutor, Judge and Jury," 
The Economist, February 20, 2010, p. 15, asserting in the wake 
of the Intel case that "Enforcement of competition law in Europe 
is unjust and must change."  See also concerning a new E.C. 
inquiry on Microsoft, "Microsoft Accuses Europe of Colluding 

















                                                 
42    .  From Addresses and Presidential Messages of Theodore 










































































d   K u r t z  
 
       w r i t t e n   b y   K e n n e d y   a n
 
rd 
d e n t )   a n d  
  EXCEL Spreadsheet      VisiCalc (written by Harva
      B u s i n e s s   S c h o o l   s t u  
       L o t u s   1 ‐ 2 ‐ 3 .  
 
  WORD word processor      WordStar, WordPerfect 
 
a l e ,   C A ,  
r e s e n t a t i o n "    
 P o w e r   P o i n t      P u r c h a s e d   f r o m   S u n n y v
     s t a r t u p   f i r m ' s   " P   
       p r o g r a m .  
c i n t o s h    
  
W i n d o w s       A d a p t e d   f r o m   A p p l e ' s   M a  
       o p e r a t i n g   s y s t e m .  
 
Internet Explorer      Leased from Spyglass, cousin   
       o f   N e t s c a p e ' s   N a v i g a t o r .  
 
  Windows Media Player    Adapted from Real Networks' Real     
    P l a y e r  Figure 1 
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